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FOUR RESERVATIONS ON CIVIL RIGHTS REASONING BY
ANALOGY: THE CASE OF LATINOS AND OTHER
NONBLACK GROUPS
Richard Delgado*
The protection of civil rights in the United States encompasses rem-
edies for at least five separate groups. Native Americans have suffered
extermination, removal, denial of sovereignty, and destruction of cul-
ture; Latinos, conquest and the indignities of a racially discriminatory
immigration system. Asian Americans suffered exclusion, wartime in-
ternment, and discriminatory labor laws. Middle Eastern people suffer
from suspicion that they are terrorists. Blacks suffered slavery and im
Crow.
Yet our system of civil rights derives, in large part, from the experi-
ence of only Blacks, and aims to redress a single, momentous harm,
namely slavery and its lingering effects. This is particularly true of the
Thirteenth Amendment, which aims to abolish slavery and other condi-
tions reminiscent of it.
American case law, particularly in connection with matters of race,
proceeds largely through a process of analogy in which courts compare
the case before them to a previous decision or statute. Nonblack groups
sometimes have been able to analogize their predicaments to ones that
Blacks suffer, but often this has proven difficult. Thus, afflictions that
visit few Blacks, such as wartime internment and language discrimina-
tion, can easily go unremedied under American law.
This Essay discusses a number of obstacles that lie in the way of
protecting Latinos and other nonblack minority groups under the cur-
rent framework of statutory and constitutional civil rights, including the
Thirteenth Amendment. After discussing drawbacks associated with a
system of civil rights protection still inflected with the rhetoric and norms
of the 1960s civil rights movement, the Essay closes by arguing that an
increasingly multiracial society such as this one needs to develop a
broader, more inclusive framework and-with Latinos in mind-
sketches one.
INTRODUCTION
In a series of articles and books, Alexander Tsesis urges that the
Thirteenth Amendment is an underappreciated source of civil rights pro-
tection for Blacks and other minority groups of color.' Although the




Supreme Court has sharply curtailed Congress's ability to craft new civil
rights legislation under traditional bases, such as the Fourteenth
Amendment and Commerce Clause, it has yet to do so with the
Thirteenth.
2
The Thirteenth Amendment, which forbids slavery as well as badges
and incidents of it, thus offers a promising source of civil rights power at
a time when opportunities under those other clauses have been shutting
down.' Tsesis and others show how the Supreme Court has narrowed the
two traditional sources of civil rights protection, usually by finding no
1. See, e.g., The Promises of Liberty: The History and Contemporary Relevance of
the Thirteenth Amendment (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010) [hereinafter The Promises of
Liberty] (containing essays on interpretation and history of Thirteenth Amendment and
"demonstrating the enduring possibility of relying on [it] ... to expand our federal gov-
ernment's role in enforcing . . . equal liberty"); Alexander Tsesis, The Thirteenth
Amendment and American Freedom: A Legal History 3, 6-7, 112-60 (2004) [hereinafter
Tsesis, Legal History] (urging attention to Thirteenth Amendment as underused tool for
protecting interests of minorities and other disenfranchised groups and discussing some
potential applications); Alexander Tsesis, A Civil Rights Approach: Achieving
Revolutionary Abolitionism Through the Thirteenth Amendment, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
1773, 1776-77, 1832-48 (2006) [hereinafter Tsesis, Civil Rights Approach] (urging that
Thirteenth Amendment can serve as broad remedy for racial wrongs, including ones with
contemporary significance and future potential); Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American
Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth Amendment, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 307, 359-60 (2004)
(suggesting applications for Thirteenth Amendment in today's world); Alexander Tsesis,
Gender Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1641, 1688-
90 (2012) [hereinafter Tsesis, Gender] (applying Thirteenth Amendment to address
gender discrimination perpetrated by small, private employers); Alexander Tsesis,
Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1337, 1338 (2009) (provid-
ing further analysis of Thirteenth Amendment's potential for civil rights reform).
2. See Tsesis, Legal History, supra note 1, at 3-4, 6-7, 44-46, 69-70, 112-17, 131-36
(noting Thirteenth Amendment is free of many doctrinal obstacles-such as state-action
requirement, intent, and interstate economic impact-that fetter Fourteenth Amendment
and Commerce Clause); Tsesis, Civil Rights Approach, supra note 1, at 1775 ("During the
preceding decade, the Rehnquist Court significantly limited Congress's Commerce Clause
and Fourteenth Amendment authority over civil rights."); see also Andrew Koppelman,
Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1917, 1933
(2012) [hereinafter Koppelman, Oiginalism] (calling Thirteenth Amendment
"underenforced"). But see Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth
Amendment, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1459, 1460 (2012) (noting courts' narrow reading of
Thirteenth Amendment).
3. See Tsesis, Legal History, supra note 1, at 92-96 (observing that Thirteenth
Amendment, properly understood, contains "social and legal component" that aims at
achieving equal liberty, including abolition of badges and incidents of slavery); see also
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Conclusion: The Political Thirteenth Amendment, 71 Md. L. Rev. 283,
294 (2011) (summarizing recent symposium on Thirteenth Amendment and concluding
that even though "the United States Supreme Court has done little to develop [its] mean-
ing," Thirteenth Amendment has played vital background role in constitutional politics on
key occasions and is likely to continue to do so in future).
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state action or an insufficient economic impact-and how the Thirteenth
Amendment can, with a little imagination, fill the gap.4
Tsesis also posits that a revitalized Thirteenth Amendment can aid
nonblack minorities, such as Latinos, Asian Americans, Native
Americans, and Middle Eastern people, gain relief from oppressive con-
ditions.5 By interpreting slavery and its present-day counterparts broadly,
the Amendment can serve as a sturdy weapon in the struggle for equal
rights for all, not just Blacks. He notes occasions when this has actually
happened and encourages litigators and scholars to be on the lookout
for additional opportunities.6
4. See Tsesis, Legal History, supra note 1, at 86 (observing "'Congress has the
power... rationally to determine"' conditions sufficiently like slavery as to justify
prohibition (quotingJones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968))); see also
Jones, 392 U.S. at 413 (upholding application of federal civil rights law to reach
discriminatory housing practices); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242-45 (1911)
(invalidating state law that criminalized breaching labor contract). But see United States v.
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 948 (1988) (declining to find Thirteenth Amendment violation
in servitude that arose through psychological means); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S.
366, 390 (1918) (holding that forced military service is not badge or incident of slavery);
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1896) (holding that Thirteenth Amendment's
scope is narrow and does not reach broad social practices, such as segregation, nor
individual behavior); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883) ("The Thirteenth
Amendment has respect, not to distinctions of race, or class, or color, but to slavery.");
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1873) ("[T]he obvious purpose [of the
Thirteenth Amendment] was to forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery.");
Tsesis, Legal History, supra note 1, at 89-91 (citing occasions when Supreme Court has
failed to find violation of Thirteenth Amendment in various discriminatory practices).
5. See Tsesis, Legal History, supra note 1, at 89 ("Congress can go much farther and
pass new statutes ... against discrimination that has burgeoned since the 1960s."); Tsesis,
Civil Rights Approach, supra note 1, at 1845 ("The Amendment's protections apply to
anyone who is subject to arbitrary restraints on the enjoyment of freedom.").
Unfortunately, Congress declined to interpret the Thirteenth Amendment broadly, enact-
ing harsh anti-Chinese, anti-Japanese, and anti-Mexican laws in spite of a Supreme Court
decision that suggested that such laws could amount to slavery. See Robertson v. Baldwin,
165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897) (noting "the addition of the words 'involuntary servitude' were
said ... to have been intended to cover the system of Mexican peonage and the Chinese
coolie trade, the practical operation of which might have been a revival of the institution
of slavery under a different and less offensive name"); see also Race and Races: Cases and
Resources for a Diverse America 302-23, 404-35 (Juan F. Perea et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007)
(describing host of such measures enacted around this time).
6. See Tsesis, Legal History, supra note 1, at 137-60 (urging litigators to use
Amendment to address Confederate symbols, hate speech and crime, access to contracep-
tion and abortion, marriage rights, procreation rights, parents' rights to guide upbringing
of their children, discriminatory employment, and modern forms of peonage, such as
contract labor); Tsesis, Civil Rights Approach, supra note 1, at 1845 (arguing 'Jews and
Arabs were among the groups classified as distinct races" and thus entitled to Thirteenth
Amendment protection); Tsesis, Gender, supra note 1, at 1688-95 (urging that
Amendment applies to discriminatory conditions of employment, human trafficking, gen-
der-motivated violence, and hate cimes). In general, for Tsesis, the Amendment "should
protect free and equal persons' rights to pursue qualitatively good lives." Tsesis, Civil
Rights Approach, supra note 1, at 1846; see also William M. Carter, Jr., The Thirteenth
18852012]
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The purpose of this Essay is to sound a cautionary note. Although
the law is constantly recognizing new remedies for old wrongs, 7 advances
have generally favored groups that are either economically or politically
powerful or seeking redress for grievances that society has already begun
to condemn.' Unfortunately, many of the situations Tsesis has in mind
(for example, Latinos complaining of heavy-handed immigration en-
forcement) fall into neither category. At the same time, the very consid-
erations that motivated the Supreme Court to narrow the Fourteenth
Amendment as a source of civil rights remediation are likely to reappear
in connection with any effort to broaden the Thirteenth.'
This Essay discusses some of those barriers, focusing on groups like
Latinos and Muslims that recently have been the subject of negative me-
dia attention. It begins by noting how two critical race theory tenets-
racial realism and interest convergence--counsel skepticism regarding
new legislative remedies for minorities, particularly during conservative
times.
Amendment and Pro-Equality Speech, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1855, 1860-64 (2012) (positing
that Amendment's underlying values provide support for laws against racist speech);
Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor Revisited: The Thirteenth Amendment and Abortion,
in The Promises of Liberty, supra note 1, at 226, 226-44 (suggesting Thirteenth
Amendment approach to lift restrictions on right to abortion); JeffreyJ. Pokorak, Rape as
a Badge of Slavery: The Legal History of, and Remedies for, Prosecutorial Race-of-Victim
Charging Disparities, 7 Nev. L.J. 1, 53 (2006) ("The history of rape as a badge of slavery...
requires more than simple assertions of the right to exercise discretion... Such litigation
would proceed under ... the Thirteenth Amendment .... "); James Gray Pope, What's
Different About the Thirteenth Amendment, and Why Does It Matter?, 71 Md. L. Rev.
189, 194-202 (2011) (noting Amendment suggests broad examination of relations of
subjugation in society, including factory labor); Rebecca E. Zietlow, James Ashley's
Thirteenth Amendment, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1697, 1728-31 (2012) [hereinafter Zietlow,
Ashley's Thirteenth Amendment] (urging that legal community should follow lead of
influential drafter of Amendment and adopt broad interpretation that will include class-
and labor-based oppression for anyone, Black or not). But see Mark A. Graber,
Subtraction by Addition?: The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 112 Colum. L.
Rev. 1501, 1508 (2012) (positing that Fourteenth Amendment may have impliedly
repealed or modified Thirteenth).
7. For a familiar example, see William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 384
(1960) (explaining how fight to privacy arose from "[p]iecing together old decisions in
which relief had been afforded on the basis of defamation, or the invasion of some prop-
erty right, or a breach of confidence or an implied contract" (footnotes omitted)).
8. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Buff. L.
Rev. 205, 218 (1979) (noting tendency of Anglo-American law to reflect interests of ruling
elite); Zietlow, Ashley's Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 1726-28 (noting even
Brown v. Board of Education did little to address economic inequality and oppression).
9. That is, the same judicial system that imposed a state-action limitation, intent re-
quirement, and a showing of a broad national economic impact could easily impose simi-
lar requirements on the Thirteenth Amendment. For example, courts could decline to
find a current practice a badge or incident of slavery because it was not intentional; not
broad and national in scope; not countenanced by regional law; or not aimed at a group
marked by race. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (suggesting conservative
judiciary will likely narrow applications of Thirteenth Amendment).
1886
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Focusing next on relief through judicial expansion of existing law,
this Essay shows how four barriers make this avenue problematic as well.
It concludes by sketching a few ideas about sources of civil rights protec-
tion for nonblack groups that are less likely to founder on the shoals
charted herein.
I. NEW REMEDIES IN DIFFICULT TIMES
Does the Thirteenth Amendment offer a promising new avenue for
racial reform? Consider two possibilities. First, one might imagine invok-
ing it (or legislation enacted under its authority) to remedy contempo-
rary wrongs against Blacks, such as excessive incarceration, prisoner
chain gangs, or extremely demeaning conditions of probation. 10 This
approach would seek to apply a traditional remedy on behalf of its origi-
nal beneficiaries, viz., Blacks, in an effort to right new wrongs against
them. The argument would analogize the new wrongs to the original
ones and urge that they are similar enough to warrant the same treat-
ment.
Second, one might imagine invoking the Amendment on behalf of a
nonblack group. Originally conceived as a means of banishing slavery
and similarly degrading conditions for Blacks, the Amendment might
well find use in today's multiracial society to alleviate ill treatment of
other groups such as Muslims, Latinos, Asian Americans, or Native
Americans." Again, one can distinguish two types of degrading treat-
ment-ones that resemble those that the black slaves suffered and those
that, while severe, are not the same ones the slaves were forced to bear.
Degrading and bewildering confinement in immigration detention facili-
ties, far from friends, family, and legal assistance for long periods of time,
might constitute an example of the latter. No slave suffered precisely this
form of mistreatment, but currently many Latinos do.12 In addition,
10. For a discussion of these and similar contemporary wrongs, see, e.g., Michelle
Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness 173-248
(2010).
11. See, e.g., Tsesis, Legal History, supra note 1, at 158-60 (suggesting that
Amendment might protect migrant workers); Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers and
the Thirteenth Amendment, in The Promises of Liberty: The History and Contemporary
Relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 279, 279 (arguing "that the
combination of current U.S. labor and immigration laws have [sic] created a caste of
workers of color, laboring beneath the floor created for free labor, denied the rights of
citizenship, and subject to human rights abuses that arguably violate the Thirteenth
Amendment"); Zietlow, Ashley's Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 1728-31
(urging expansive interpretation that will improve status of all workers, not just Blacks).
12. On immigration detention, see, for example, Barbara A. Frey & X. Kevin Zhao,
The Criminalization of Immigration and the International Norm of Non-Discrimination:
Deportation and Detention in U.S. Immigration Law, 29 Law & Ineq. 279, 279 (2011)
("[T]he selective convergence of criminal and immigration law contributes to a violation
of a broader human rights norm-that citizens and non-citizens alike are entitled to equal
dignity and inalienable rights, and that any discriminatory treatment of non-citizens must
2012] 1887
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many recent state and local ordinances criminalize practically everything
an undocumented immigrant might want to do-register a child in
school, work, rent an apartment, visit an emergency room, or seek a ride
from a friend. 13 Many of these ordinances resemble, in harshness and
pervasiveness, Jim Crow laws and the Black Codes of former years.'
4
Could lawyers for Latino groups invoke the Thirteenth Amendment
to challenge practices such as these? All such efforts would confront two
obstacles. One consists of broad social headwinds that impede any ad-
vance by minority groups, particularly during conservative times.15 And
another consists of limitations inherent in judicial reasoning itself, par-
ticularly arguments that proceed by analogy. 6
Both drawbacks seem rooted in the nature of the common law sys-
tem. Since the inception of that form of law, the United States has opted
for a set of simply stated rules, trading a degree of uncertainty at the pe-
be proportional to achieving a legitimate state objective."); Andrew Bramante, Note,
Ending Indefinite Detention of Non-Citizens, 61 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 933, 936 (2011)
(arguing "that though the Supreme Court is not compelled by its precedents to strike
down the indefinite-detention regulation, it has ample latitude to, and should, do so"). On
the conditions in which many Latinos live, see Richard Delgado, Locating Latinos in the
Field of Civil Rights: Assessing the Neoliberal Case for Radical Exclusion, 83 Tex. L. Rev.
489, 503 n.90 (2004) (book review) [hereinafter Delgado, Locating] (discussing United
Nations study showing that all Blacks living in United States, considered as separate na-
tion, would rank forty-sixth in world on index of human flourishing that included educa-
tion, income, infant mortality, longevity, access to health care, and several other measures,
while Latinos would rank sixty-eighth); Hope Yen, Census Shows Nearly Half of Americans
Are Poor or Low-Income, Seattle Times (Dec. 14, 2011), http://seattletimes.nwsource
.com/text/2017018125.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting Latinos
topped list for poorest group at seventy-three percent).
13. On one such law in Alabama, see, for example, Campbell Robertson, Critics See
"Chilling Effect" in Alabama Immigration Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 2011, at A14 (discuss-
ing how immigration law deters children who are illegal immigrants from attending
school, even though all children have right to public education regardless of citizenship);
Crisis in Alabama: Immigration Law Causes Chaos, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/print/
crisis-alabama-immigration-law-causes-chaos (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited Aug. 7, 2012) (announcing that ACLU filed lawsuit charging that Alabama law is
unconstitutional because it allows for "unlawful search and seizure[;] ... unlawfully deters
immigrant families from enrolling their children in public schools; unconstitutionally bars
many lawfully present immigrants from attending public colleges or universities in
Alabama; drastically restricts the right to enter into contracts; and interferes with federal
power and authority over immigration matters").
14. On this period, see, for example, Race and Races: Cases and Resources for a
Diverse America, supra note 5, at 148-62, 1036, 1051-52 (describing lynching, racism
within armed forces, NAACP and struggle for civil rights, arrest rates, and prospects for ex-
convicts).
15. See infra Part L.A (discussing how racial realism and interest convergence block
advances by minority groups).
16. See infra Part I.B (examining limitations in legal reasoning that impede use of
Thirteenth Amendment by nonblack groups).
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riphery for clarity at the core. 7 Because of this feature, lawgivers will of-
ten encounter situations that call for either a new rule or an extension of
an old one to cover the new situation. This constant process, which is
both a strength and weakness of our system, leaves much open to discre-
tion, judgment, and indeterminacy.18 Consider, now, a number of factors
that operate forcefully in the resulting vacuum, especially in the area of
race.
A. Broad Social Forces: Racial Realism and Interest Convergence
1. Racial Realism. - Coined by the late Derrick Bell, "racial realism"
holds that minorities are apt to experience, at most, intermittent and
insecure gains. 9 With roots in legal realism-the notion that judicial rea-
soning responds to attitudinal and social pressures in addition to logic
and the force of precedent-racial realism is both a generalization that
Bell derives from examining legal history and a caution for reformers.
0
The descriptive part holds that racial progress usually traces a course full
of peaks and valleys, with sudden breakthroughs followed by inevitable
retrenchment.21 In other words, racism, once deeply engrained in a soci-
ety, rarely yields entirely to reform efforts. It is too profitable, comforta-
ble, and convenient for those in charge to forgo entirely.
Racial realism holds that even with measures that are seemingly ab-
solute on their face (like the Thirteenth Amendment, which forbids slav-
ery in absolute terms and contains no state action or intent require-
ment), one can expect resistance, narrow interpretation, avoidance, or
17. Richard Delgado, The Language of the Arms Race: Should the People Limit
Government Speech?, 64 B.U. L. Rev. 961,995 n.198 (1984).
18. For further theoretical discussion of this process, see Roberto Mangabeira Unger,
The Critical Legal Studies Movement 1-4, 8-11 (1986) (positing that this type of legal
process "contrasts with open-ended disputes about the basic terms of social life"); Robert
W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive
Critique 413, 420 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) (discussing how lawyers create belief
structures that "demobilize[]" them into thinking that world consists of objectively deter-
mined social relations, when in fact these rules "are not found in nature but are histori-
cally contingent"). On the role of these concepts in litigating Latino rights, see George A.
Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-American Litigation
Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 555, 559 (1994) (arguing "that exposing the
exercise of judicial discretion and the lack of inevitability in civil rights cases is
important ... because it helps reveal the extent to which the courts have helped or failed
to help establish [Latino] rights . . . [and] it may help break down barriers to racial
reform").
19. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 363, 373 (1992) ("Black people will
never gain full equality in this country. Even those herculean efforts we hail as successful
will produce no more than temporary... short-lived victories .... We must acknowledge
it and move on to adopt policies based on what I call: 'Racial Realism."').
20. See id. at 363-65 (explaining how civil rights activists should reform strategies in
similar way that Legal Realists reformed approach to American jurisprudence).




delay.2 2 For example, is a guest worker program that effectively chains
Mexican workers to one employer, denies them the ability to organize or
form a union, and assigns them to arduous, low-paid work under sweat-
shop conditions a case of modern-day slavery or peonage? One might
think so. 23 But a court might reason that the program is not precisely like
plantation-style slavery with shackles and whips. It did not remove the
workers forcibly from their homes in another continent and transport
them to the United States in chains. Nor is it identical to the prison work
gangs for Blacks that sometimes ran afoul of antipeonage legislation en-
acted under the Thirteenth Amendment.
2 4
One thinks of further differences: Were the guest workers not free
to accept or reject the work at one point, perhaps when they signed up?
Furthermore, who has standing? Only someone who is a current worker,
or someone who was one a few years ago but has left? What if the denial
of rights took place years ago and the statute of limitations has expired,
yet the workers only now have been able realistically to consult a lawyer?
What if the abuse occurred recently but the most promising plaintiff is
now out of the country? A racial realist would point out that objections
like these are apt to loom large, especially when a relatively powerless
worker confronts a well-financed and influential adversary and is assert-
ing a novel right to relief.
25
22. On the way courts in the period following Reconstruction interpreted civil rights
protections narrowly, see William M. Wiecek, Emancipation and Civic Status: The
American Experience, 1865-1915, in The Promises of Liberty, supra note 1, at 78, 89-94
(discussing how movement by Whites in southern states to subordinate status of Blacks was
"consistently abetted by the U.S. Supreme Court, which rejected the more expansive aboli-
tionist/Republican vision of a rights regime secured by federal power and unwittingly
created legal opportunities for malevolent Southern legal ingenuity").
23. See Ontiveros, supra note 11, at 279-90 (analyzing whether immigrant workers
might be considered slaves). On formal guest worker (Bracero) programs, see Latinos and
the Law: Cases and Materials 433-38 (Richard Delgado et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter
Latinos and the Law] (providing history of temporary worker programs from World War I
through "Operation Wetback").
24. See, e.g., David M. Oshinsky, Convict Labor in the Post-Civil War South:
Involuntary Servitude After the Thirteenth Amendment, in The Promises of Liberty, supra
note 1, at 100, 100-18 (describing "gaping hole" left by Thirteenth Amendment for crimi-
nal peonage); Woody R. Clermont, Unshackling the Punishment Clause: A Call for the
End of Convict Slavery, 3 Freedom Center J. 1, 3 (2011) ("The concept of enslaving pris-
oners is not new; it stems from the 'Punishment Clause' in the Thirteenth
Amendment....").
25. For a more extensive discussion of reparations claims, see Ronald L. Mize, Jr.,
Reparations for Mexican Braceros? Lessons Learned from Japanese and African American
Attempts at Redress, 52 Clev. St. L. Rev. 273, 275 (2005) ("From the successful reparations
campaign for those who endured the Japanese internment camps, we can develop a proxy
for other redress attempts to follow. From the repeatedly unsuccessful attempts at African-
American reparations, we also can begin to recognize the long-standing roots of racial
oppression ...."); Eric L. Ray, Comment, Mexican Repatriation and the Possibility for a
Federal Cause of Action: A Comparative Analysis on Reparations, 37 U. Miami Inter-Am.
[Vol. 112:18831890
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2. Interest Convergence. - A second tenet, also associated with Bell, is
interest convergence. A close relative of racial realism, interest conver-
gence posits that advances for Blacks and perhaps other minorities arrive
only when they also are in the interest of elite Whites.
26 Mary Dudziak,27
Michael Klarman, 28 and Phillip Klinkner and Rogers Smith 29 have put
forward versions of this thesis in connection with black history, and this
Essay's author has advanced a similar model to explain developments in
Latino rights.30 Interest convergence as a possible avenue for remedying
racial wrongs is discussed later in this Essay.31 For now, however, it is
worth noting that most of the historians who find it a useful tool employ
it descriptively to explain, after the fact, the twists and turns of black for-
tunes, and not to frame an agenda for reform.
32
In either guise, interest convergence suggests a lesson for Thirteenth
Amendment enthusiasts. Despite its seemingly unambiguous mandate
("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime[,] . . .shall exist within the United States"3 3), experience shows
that lawmakers are apt to find the Amendment applicable only when do-
L. Rev. 171, 178-82 (2005) (discussing barriers to actions for wrongful deportations car-
ried out during Operation Wetback and other immigration sweeps).
26. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 523 (1980) [hereinafter Bell, Dilemma]. For a discussion
of the role of interest convergence in critical race thought, see Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction 8, 20-24, 47, 145 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinaf-
ter Delgado & Stefancic, Critical].
27. See Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American
Democracy 15 (2000) ("Lynching and racial segregation provoked international outrage,
and by 1949 race in America was a principal Soviet propaganda theme. These develop-
ments led the Truman administration to realize that race discrimination harmed U.S.
foreign relations.").
28. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights
Movement 75 (2007) ("On many policy issues that become constitutional disputes, opin-
ion correlates heavily with socioeconomic status, with elites tending to hold more liberal
views on certain social issues, though not on economic ones.").
29. See Philip A. Klinkner & Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and
Decline of Racial Equality in America 3-4 (1999) (noting that Black advances have pro-
ceeded unevenly, with most arriving during wartime).
30. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Roundelay: Hernandez v. Texas and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 41 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 23, 31 (2006) [hereinafter Delgado,
Roundelay] ("If you examine Latino legal history, you see the same interest convergence
that explains Brown v. Board of Education .. " (internal quotation marks omitted)).
31. See infra Part II.A (examining how interest convergence can yield opportunities
for civil rights reforms for nonblack groups).
32. Compare Stephen M. Feldman, Do the Right Thing: Understanding the Interest-
Convergence Thesis, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 248, 258 (2012) ("As a historical thesis, interest
convergence is especially provocative [because] . .. it suggests an ironic pattern in
American history-a pattern that does not follow or mirror the major historical actors'
declarations of purposes and reasons."), with Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-
Convergence Thesis, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 149, 161 (2011) ("[Bell's] Interest-Convergence prin-
cipally contemplates what will be, rather than what has been.").
33. U.S. Const. amend. XIII.
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ing so benefits white elite groups. For example, racial profiling of
Muslims, 34 oppressive local ordinances criminalizing most of the condi-
tions of life for undocumented immigrants, 3 5 indefinite detention of sus-
pected terrorists without a trial 3 and a host of practices denying gay and
lesbian individuals the same rights as heterosexuals 37 all would seem
prime candidates for condemnation under the Amendment, since treat-
ment of individuals in these groups could be characterized as degrading,
dehumanizing, and pervasive. Yet no condemnation of any of these prac-
tices has come to pass. Bell, if he were still alive, might say that this is not
because of doubt over how oppressive and degrading these conditions
are, but rather because each of these conditions is a favorite child of
some empowered group, such as the intelligence establishment.' The
time to condemn these practices has not come simply because the inter-
est of the majority still finds it useful to maintain these conditions.
The interest-convergence limitation would seem to set in most force-
fully in connection with proposals for legislative relief. Might courts be
less susceptible to pressures of this sort?
B. Limitations Inherent in Legal Reasoning: Novel Remedies and the Role of
Analogy
When a new group clamors for relief from some oppressive condi-
tion, it may either take its cause to the legislature, to the streets, or to the
courts. Since courts cannot craft an entirely new statute or remedy (that
is, not without raising the complaint that they are being excessively activ-
ist), judicial relief would need to arrive through expansion of a
preexisting doctrine. This requires that a judge declare the new griev-
34. See Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence
as Crimes of Passion, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1259, 1262 (2004) ("The physical violence exercised
upon the bodies of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians has been accompanied by a legal
and political violence toward these communities.").
35. See, e.g., Heather Miller, Alabama's Immigration Law Does No Good,
alabamacivilrights (Oct. 10, 2011), http://alabamacivilrights.wordpress.com/2011/10/
10/alabamas-immigration-law-does-no-good (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(quoting chief sponsor of Alabama House Bill 56 as saying it aimed to "attack every area of
an illegal alien's life"). For analysis of recent state and town laws that curtail the liberties of
undocumented people, see Latinos and the Law, supra note 23, at 473-74, 477-80.
36. See David Cole, Closing Guantinamo: The Problem of Preventive Detention, Bos.
Rev., Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 17, 17 ("[T]he problem with Guantinamo Bay... is not the de-
tention of enemy combatants. The problem is that the Bush administration has denied fair
hearings, resulting in the detention of many who were not enemy fighters .. ").
37. See generally Anthony C. Infanti, Everyday Law for Gays and Lesbians and Those
Who Care About Them (2007) (discussing disadvantages that legal system imposes on this
group).
38. See Bell, Dilemma, supra note 26, at 523 (suggesting "remedies may instead be
the outward manifestations of unspoken and perhaps subconscious judicial conclusions
that the remedies, if granted, will secure, advance, or at least not harm societal interests
deemed important by middle and upper class whites").
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ance similar enough to ones that the system currently recognizes to war-
rant extending relief.39
This, in turn, entails a consideration of analogical reasoning. As al-
ready mentioned in this Part, American law often proceeds through a
process in which courts compare the case before them to a known land-
mark, usually a previous decision or statute covering the issue in ques-
tion.40 The more dissimilar the current event to the previous one, the
greater the leap that is required to see this as a case of that, and the lower
the likelihood of success.
4 1
As mentioned, civil rights doctrine in the United States encompasses
remedies for at least five separate racial or ethnic groups, all standing on
slightly different footings. Native Americans suffered extermination, re-
moval, denial of sovereignty, and destruction of community land rights.
42
Latinos suffered conquest and associated indignities, followed by a sys-
39. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1965) (deriving right to
contraception from emanations and penumbras of other constitutional rights); see also
Tsesis, Legal History, supra note 1, at 97 ("The amendment is a negative grant of freedom
in that it prohibits arbitrary infringements against autonomy. Historical analysis is neces-
sary to determine the extent to which such infringements are analogous to involuntary
servitude.").
40. On the role of analogy in legal reasoning in general, see Pierre Schlag & David
Skover, Tactics of Legal Reasoning 31-33, 64-69 (1986) (discussing variety of moves and
countermoves, including how to attack improper analogy). On the role of analogy in legal
reasoning in relation to the Thirteenth Amendment, see Tsesis, Legal History, supra note
1, at 97 (noting role of history in determining whether certain practices are sufficiently
analogous to slavery and should therefore be prohibited); Koppelman, Originalism, supra
note 2, at 1936 ("When we consider the self-executing Thirteenth Amendment, we are still
asking the same question: is the practice complained of sufficiently analogous to
[slavery]?").
41. How broadly or narrowly may legal actors legitimately deploy an analogy? In a
commonly used example, a bystander shoots an intelligent Martian who has just arrived on
Earth and is in the middle of a welcoming speech. Would this be murder? The Martian has
limbs, a brain, and speaks English. An originalist might examine the text of the murder
statute and ask whether it says anything about Martians, whereas a liberal constructionist
might inquire whether the Martian is sufficiently like a human being to warrant prosecut-
ing the shooter, and a progressive constitutionalist might consider whether the murder
statute is broad enough to cover the shooting in light of contemporary norms and values.
On the application of contemporary norms to modern interpretations of the Thirteenth
Amendment, see Tsesis, Civil Rights Approach, supra note 1, at 1843-44 ("The ideas of the
Thirteenth Amendment's framers, while invaluable, cannot be the endpoint of construc-
tion.... Their ideas and those of their abolitionist mentors are nevertheless essential for
comprehending the Amendment's significance to contemporary incidents of involuntary
servitude .... ). Is the Martian example itself a good analogy for an inquiry about the
Thirteenth Amendment? Both concern the application of an ancient remedy to a novel
situation. Yet the two situations are not precisely the same. On the role of analogy in
Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence, see supra note 40 (discussing analogical reasoning
when applying Thirteenth Amendment to modern situations); infra notes 51-56 and
accompanying text (discussing why analogical reasoning under Thirteenth Amendment
offers little prospect of success, particularly with respect to nonblack minority groups).
42. See, e.g., Race and Races: Cases and Resources for a Diverse America, supra note
5, at 179-284 (discussing issues confronting Native Americans).
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tem of laws very similar to those (Jim Crow) which society imposed on
Blacks, but coupled with a highly restrictive immigration system. 43 Asian
Americans suffered official exclusion, wartime internment, and discrimi-
natory land and labor laws. 44 Middle Eastern people labor under official
profiling based on suspicion that they may be plotting terrorism.4 5 Blacks
of course suffered slavery, Jim Crow, and lingering discrimination in
every avenue of life.46
Furthermore, for each group the indignities have changed over
time. A century ago, Blacks labored under the Black Codes; today, they
suffer from the loss of industrial jobs, police profiling, and an educa-
tional system that seems to have given up on them.47 Latinos, once the
invisible minority, now find the heat turned up under them on a dozen
different fronts. 48 Middle Eastern people suffer suspicion approaching
that which black men invariably meet on city sidewalks and street cor-
ners.
49
Despite this range of harms, which shift over time, our statutory and
constitutional system of civil rights is based largely on the experience of
only one of these groups, Blacks, and aims to redress a single, momen-
tous harm whose heyday occurred more than a century ago, namely slav-
ery, as well as its lingering effects.50
43. See, e.g., id. at 285-396 (discussing issues confronting Latinos).
44. See, e.g., id. at 397-486 (discussing issues confronting Asian Americans).
45. See, e.g., Ahmad, supra note 34, at 1278 ("Both individual acts of hate violence
and governmental racial profiling have helped to create a new racial construct: the
'Muslim-looking' person. The logic of post-September 11 profiling turns on an equation of
being Muslim with being a terrorist.").
46. See Race and Races: Cases and Resources for a Diverse America, supra note 5, at
96-178 (examining range of issues that Blacks face).
47. See id. at 171-78 (looking at contemporary racism against Blacks).
48. See Latinos and the Law, supra note 23, at 141, 228, 307, 405, 634, 747-48
(discussing identity and social formation, English-only laws, school funding discrimination,
immigration, employment discrimination, and coerced sterilization); Race and Races:
Cases and Resources for a Diverse America, supra note 5, at 384-96 (discussing current
issues facing Latinos).
49. See Ahmad, supra note 34, at 1278 (noting that contemporary Muslim-looking
construct "relies upon a reductive equation of certain perceived identity characteristics
with specific, suspect conduct" and comparing it to "earlier profiling regimes [under
which] ... African American... appearance has been equated with criminality").
50. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Toolkit-Fit to Dismantle That Famous
House?, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 283, 290-91, 297-98 (2000) [hereinafter Delgado, Toolkit] (dis-
cussing how civil rights thought tends to view Blacks as "paradigmatic," and nonblack
groups receive attention only to extent that their issues can be analogized to those of
Blacks); Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science"
of American Racial Thought, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1213, 1219-20 (1997) [hereinafter Perea,
Binary Paradigm] ("[T]he Black/White binary paradigm... [is] the conception that race
in America consists, either exclusively or primarily, of only two constituent racial groups,
the Black and the White.... The mere recognition that 'other people of color' exist... is
merely a reassertion of the Black/White paradigm.").
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Nonblack groups sometimes have been able to analogize their pre-
dicaments to ones that Blacks suffer,5 ' just as the latter have sometimes
been able to win relief for new injuries by comparing them to ones that
their slave ancestors suffered, but often the effort has failed. Thus war-
time internment,52 language discrimination,5 3 suppression of Native
American religions,54 and profiling based on presumed foreign appear-
ance55 -afflictions that do not stem from the enslavement of Blacks-
have largely gone without redress under American law, even though
these injuries might appear comparable to ones that lie at the heart of
our system of racial remedies.5 6
Why? Aside from the broad societal forces mentioned above (racial
realism and interest convergence), four drawbacks associated with judi-
cial reasoning weigh against most of these expansions, particularly ones
proceeding under new, broad banners such as the Thirteenth
Amendment.
1. History Shows Little Grounds for Optimism. - The first reason why
one should not be overly sanguine about the prospect of an expanded
role for judicial activism under the Thirteenth Amendment is, simply,
that history shows little tendency toward expansion in closely related ar-
eas. In this sense, Professor Tsesis's remedy is at war with itself. The
prime reason he urges attention to the Thirteenth Amendment as a new
means of redressing racial wrongs is that courts have been cutting back
51. E.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) ("Throughout our history
differences in race and color have defined easily identifiable groups .... But community
prejudices are not static, and from time to time other differences from the community
norm may define other groups which need the same protection."). For a discussion of the
relatively limited benefit the Hernandez decision brought litigators for Latino causes, see
Delgado, Roundelay, supra note 30, at 36-40.
52. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (upholding
wartime internment of West CoastJapanese individuals).
53. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371-72 (1991) (affirming prosecutor's
dismissal of Spanish-speaking jurors for fear that they might not pay exclusive attention to
official translation of court testimony). On Latino language rights in English-only regimes,
see Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 269, 357-71 (1992) (discussing discrimi-
natory, anti-Hispanic origins of English-only movements).
54. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (denying
Native American group right to ingest peyote as part of religious practice).
55. See Abmad, supra note 34, at 1278-82 (discussing racial profiling of "Muslim-
looking" individuals).
56. That is, each of these practices seems comparable, but not identical, to ones that
Blacks suffered during the Jim Crow era. Evaluating such claims requires an examination
of reasoning by analogy. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (discussing role of
analogy in finding relief under Thirteenth Amendment for claims made by nonblack
groups).
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on the scope of the Fourteenth.5 7 But the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments are constitutional twins. Aiming to redress many of the
same wrongs-namely slavery, Jim Crow, and other demeaning practices
aimed at Blacks-the Reconstruction Congress enacted them both dur-
ing a period of civil rights fervor.
58
But if one reflects on the tenor of our times,59 especially in light of
the two interpretive principles (racial realism and interest convergence)
mentioned above, one sees that such a doctrinal breakthrough is un-
likely. Merely substituting one Reconstruction Amendment (the
Thirteenth) for another (the Fourteenth), which is suffering contraction
right now, is unlikely to yield a much better result. The lesson one draws
from the nearest set of historically analogous material, then, is that
courts are unlikely to see new harms as similar enough to historic ones as
to require relief. They will, in short, reject analogies to historic harms
under the Thirteenth Amendment, just as they have been doing increas-
ingly under the Fourteenth.
2. Empathy Decreases the Greater the Analogical Leap. - Empathy-see-
ing your pain as like mine-is very often a function of seeing a sufferer as
like oneself, as a member of one's own kind.' It is hard to empathize
with the fate of a being or person radically unlike oneself or one's kin.
Norm theory holds that we respond to news of another's misfortune by
reference to how normal or abnormal we find the predicament for that
person.61 We read about a famine in sub-Saharan Africa but remain un-
57. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Tsesis's theories
regarding use of Thirteenth Amendment as new source of civil rights protection for vari-
ous groups).
58. See Tsesis, Legal History, supra note 1, at 2-3, 37-48, 112-17 (discussing legisla-
tive history and scope of Reconstruction Amendments); Tsesis, Civil Rights Approach,
supra note 1, at 1811, 1834-37 (noting similar origin and sweep of two provisions, which
went into force after Congressional debate over need to dismantle slavery and black sub-
ordination).
59. To wit, conservative, especially in matters of race. See, e.g., Michael K. Brown et
al., Whitewashing Race: The Myth of a Color-Blind Society 3-5 (2003) (critiquing con-
servative insistence that America is now colorblind).
60. On the role of empathy in the law, see, for example, Martha C. Nussbaum, From
Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law, at xviii-xix (2010) (as-
serting "the capacity for imaginative and emotional participation in the lives of others is an
essential ingredient" of legal regime of equal respect); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's
Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 61, 67-68 (1996) [here-
inafter Delgado, Empathy] (urging critical examination of concept of empathy and noting
that it can be misguided, superficial, or insincere); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and
Empathy, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1574, 1576 (1987) (discussing how judges should use empathy
both in their discovery of facts and justifications for conclusions).
61. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Twelfth Chronicle: The Problem of the
Shanty, 85 Geo. L.J. 667, 674 (1997) ("[O]ur response to someone in need is a function of
what we believe is normal for that person .... If we believe that the person in need is usu-
ally wretched-and that such a condition is his or her ordinary one-then we are less
likely to intervene." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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moved, because we believe that famines are common in that part of the
world.
62
But if our next-door neighbor shows up on our doorstep, desperate
from not having eaten for three days because her husband deserted her,
leaving her penniless, we are immediately alarmed.6" This is not sup-
posed to happen in nice neighborhoods like ours. We offer her some
food and put her in touch with a lawyer and a social service agency that
can provide temporary relief.
Similarly, with the legal system, the more analogous a current case
strikes us to a previous one in which our intuition was clear, the more
likely we are to want to dispose of it in similar fashion.64 The common law
proceeds largely through a process of analogy in which courts compare
the case before them to a known landmark, usually a previous decision or
a statute bearing on the issue in question. 65 The more dissimilar the
event to the previous one, the greater the analogical and imaginative
leap required to see it as a case of the earlier one, and the lower the like-
lihood of success.
Although the mental process behind empathy and analogical rea-
soning is similar, the payoffs differ in the two cases, particularly when a
petitioner asks a court to apply analogical reasoning on behalf of a new
group or to condemn a new wrong suffered by an old one. In ordinary
life, empathy benefits the holder, by permitting insight into the feelings
and desires of another person.66 By enabling the empathic individual to
be a better lover, negotiator, or neighbor, it enables the possessor to
make advantageous trades and get what he or she wants in return.67
With judges, however, many of the incentives weigh in the opposite
direction. A court that falls into the habit of pronouncing this like that
(some earlier harm) too often can bring down the wrath of the gods. Ju-
62. Id.
63. See id. ("[Ilf our middle-class neighbor shows up at our door having lost his or
her job and been evicted, we are much more solicitous. Hunger is abnormal for such a
person. Everyone rushes in to help." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
64. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 1 (1921) ("Although
[common law] is essentially a mode ofjudicial and juristic thinking .... it succeeds every-
where in molding rules, whatever their origin, into accord with its principles and in main-
taining those principles in the face of formidable attempts to overthrow or to supersede
them.").
65. See id. at 12 ("Legal history... may be made to show us the analogies, .... which
have developed as the potential bases of legal growth. It may be made to show us the ideals
... to which jurists and judges have sought to make law conform by ... use of these analo-
gies .... ").
66. See Delgado, Empathy, supra note 60, at 75 ("Empathic people ought to get
ahead. The capacity ought to confer an evolutionary advantage .... (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
67. See id. ("If one has the ability to perceive what the other person wants, one can
offer him or her that and get what one wants in return." (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
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dicial activism these days is practically an epithet. 68 Few judges hoping to
advance, not to mention avoid reversal, will engage in it very often. And,
as mentioned, many of the types of case that Professor Tsesis hopes will
fall under a reinvigorated Thirteenth Amendment will lie at two removes
from their historical prototype, slavery.69 First, they will stem from con-
temporary harms that resemble slavery in some but not all respects. Se-
cond, some will target different groups, such as Latinos or Middle
Eastern people. Thus, these cases will require the type of double analogi-
cal leap that courts increasingly refuse to perform under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the nearest constitutional analog. To suppose that they will
seize on the opportunity to do so under the Thirteenth is to place a great
deal of faith in the power of analogical reasoning.70
3. Constitutional Structure and the Separation of Powers. - A further rea-
son for skepticism over the alacrity with which courts, at least, are apt to
deploy the Thirteenth Amendment to protect new, disfavored groups is
the plenary power doctrine. Under this doctrine, congressional decisions
related to immigration generally should not be subjected to judicial scru-
tiny.71 For two groups currently subject to harsh treatment-Latinos and
Middle Eastern people-much of their misery arrives through the system
of immigration enforcement, almost all of which falls under either con-
gressional or presidential authority, or, at any rate, might appear to do so
in the eyes of a timid court fearful of exceeding its proper scope.
68. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, Are Liberal Judges Really Judicial Activists?, Time (June
9, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1995232,00.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) ("To hear conservatives tell it, America has long been under
attack by liberal judges who use vague constitutional clauses to impose their views.").
69. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (suggesting that Thirteenth
Amendment can help nonblack minorities gain relief from oppressive conditions).
70. For example, the Japanese did not need reparations for slavery; rather, they
needed it for wartime internment. Latinos do not require freedom from the badges and
incidents of slavery, but rather the badges and incidents of conquest, including loss of
ancestral lands, destruction of culture, suppression of their native language, and a public
school system that systematically renders their history invisible. A model of redress should
be tailored to the history of the group to which it will be applied. Occasionally, society will
treat Asians or Latinos as it did the slaves, such as by requiring them to do coolie-style la-
bor or forcing them into farm crews for work under unremittingly harsh conditions. Then,
nothing is wrong with applying an abolitionist model or a statute enacted under the au-
thority of the Thirteenth Amendment. But these nonblack groups will experience many
indignities that the slaves did not endure, so trying to force them into a paradigm-the
Thirteenth Amendment-for which they are ill suited is a poor approach. See Delgado,
Toolkit, supra note 50, at 297 ("Binary thinking can easily allow one to believe that
America made only one historical mistake-for example, slavery. If so, the prime order of
business is to redress that mistake by making its victims whole; the concerns of other
groups would come into play only insofar as they resemble [slavery] . ).
71. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606-07 (1889) ("The power
of the government to exclude foreigners from the country whenever, in its judgment, the
public interests require such exclusion, has been asserted in repeated instances, and never
denied by the executive or legislative departments.").
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A court weighing a demand for relief from one of the forms of mis-
treatment listed above, then, is apt to perform a type of analogical rea-
soning different from the one a petitioner urges. Instead of analogizing
the harm to a badge or incident of slavery, the court is likely to analogize
the event (e.g., race-based immigration laws and quotas, limitations on
asylum, profiling, waterboarding, deportation) to a badge or incident of
sovereign power or the president's ability to manage international affairs
and the military.7 2 As mentioned earlier, analogy operates much more
forcefully and reliably in favor of the powerful, not the weak.7" When our
legal system denied relief to Japanese individuals interned in wartime
camps,74 to Latinos asserting language rights, 75 and to Native Americans
resisting removal from their ancestral lands76 or seeking to ingest peyote
as part of their religion, 77 it saw few constitutional problems. The law is
apt to protect powerful groups, such as publishers, military officers, or
consumers, more assiduously than it does ones who are currently unpop-
ular or considered to be in the way of progress.
4. Custom and Mindset: The Role of the Black-White Binary Paradigm of
Race. - A further consideration weighing against a revitalized Thirteenth
Amendment as a source of constitutional power to redress racial wrongs
for nonblack groups is what has come to be known as the black-white bi-
nary paradigm of race. 78 Articulated most forcefully in our time by Juan
Perea, the black-white binary is the name for the tendency of most legal
and racial discourse to place two groups, and them alone, at the center
of analysis.
79
In our society, those two groups are Blacks and Whites. Other
groups may at times command attention, but their treatment must be
subordinate to that of the two prime players in America's history.80 Those
72. That is, the court is likely to see the practice in terms of presidential or congres-
sional authority.
73. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
74. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (upholding wartime in-
ternment of West CoastJapanese individuals).
75. See supra note 53 (discussing language discrimination against Spanish-speaking
individuals).
76. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573-74 (1823) (articulating
doctrine of Manifest Destiny as basis for displacing Native Americans from ancestral
lands).
77. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (denying
Native American group right to ingest peyote as part of religious practice).
78. See supra note 50 (defining black-white binary paradigm).
79. Perea, Binary Paradigm, supra note 50, at 1219-20. On some of the consequences
of a binary approach to civil rights, see Delgado, Toolkit, supra note 50, at 291-306
(examining "ways that binary thinking.., can end up harming even the group whose for-
tunes one is inclined to place at the center").
80. See Perea, Binary Paradigm, supra note 50, at 1228 ("The reified binary structure
of discourse on race leaves no room for people of color who do not fit the rigid Black and
White boxes supplied by the paradigm.").
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two groups are virtually constitutive of what is meant by race-with them,
one sees racial conflict, drama, and redemption in their starkest, most
paradigmatic forms.8' Analysis of racial problems and issues in these
terms is, for Perea, the "normal science" of American legal thought.
8 2
If one understands the relations of Blacks and Whites and their his-
tory with each other, one will grasp what it means to speak of race and
racism in their most basic senses-or so the binary holds .8 Perea and
others show how this binary paradigm structures much of our thinking
about race and civil rights and shapes the work of several influential writ-
ers. 4 Other scholars, including this author, show how it has guided judi-
cial thinking, as well. 5
The black-white binary paradigm of race enters into and reinforces
each of the three above reservations. s 6 But it also constitutes a fourth,
independent reason for doubting whether the Thirteenth Amendment
will find application anytime soon as a source of civil rights protection for
nonblack groups. For the binary means, first, that nonblack groups will
always strike most observers as peripheral actors in the ongoing racial
drama. Latinos, for example, are apt to strike many as nonminorities,
8 7
even though their history, treatment, and current condition are in many
81. See id. at 1219 ("If one conceives of race and racism as primarily of concern only
to Blacks and Whites, and understands 'other people of color' only through some unclear
analogy to the 'real' races, this just restates the binary paradigm with a slight concession to
demographics.").
82. See id. at 1217 ("[N]ormal science seems 'an attempt to force nature into the
performed [sic] and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies. No part of the
aim of normal science is to call forth new sorts of phenomena; indeed those that will not
fit the box are often not seen at all."' (quoting Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions 24 (2d ed. 1970))).
83. See, e.g., Peter Baker, A Splinter on the Race Advisory Board: First Meeting Yields
Divergent Views on Finding "One America," Wash. Post, July 15, 1997, at A4 (discussing
views of Race Advisory Board Chairman John Hope Franklin who asserted that inasmuch
as this nation "cut its eyeteeth" on racism against Blacks, it would not be necessary for
board to consider other groups). In recent times, the binary and its associated mindset
make it very difficult for those in the American South to take seriously racism in the form
of anti-Latino statutes. There, racial oppression has historically targeted Blacks so that,
understandably perhaps, the region is attuned to that variety only.
84. See Perea, Binary Paradigm, supra note 50, at 1221-39 (discussing work of
Andrew Hacker, Cornel West, Toni Morrison, and writers in white studies school).
85. See, e.g., Delgado, Toolkit, supra note 50, at 296-97 (describing how Supreme
Court justices who championed civil rights for Blacks have also supported legality of racist
acts against nonblack groups).
86. See supra notes 57-77 and accompanying text (discussing drawbacks associated
with judicial reasoning that weigh against using Thirteenth Amendment to address harms
against nonblack groups).
87. See, e.g., Delgado, Locating, supra note 12, at 490 (discussing how author Paul
Brest "warn[s] of the danger of dilution when well-meaning activists and administrators
extend civil rights programs to groups beyond their original beneficiaries").
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ways comparable to those of Blacks. 8 Asians are apt to seem like "model
minorities," with high average levels of education, intact families, and
little tendency to engage in crime. 9 Native Americans are apt to strike
most observers as noble, spiritual creatures who now, finally, have been
able to win economic relief by operating gambling casinos on Indian res-
ervations. 90 Some are now rich, drive expensive cars, and send their kids
to private schools.9'
Some observers may cite a second concern, namely that devoting at-
tention to nonblack causes will dilute effort or empathy that ought, by
right, to be reserved for Blacks, the group most deeply wounded by rac-
ism and the one about whom America has, deservedly, the most troubled
social conscience.92 Once America finishes reckoning with its transgres-
sions toward this group, then and only then will attention properly turn
toward redress for ones whose suffering has been lighter.
Finally, in the minds of some, the black-white binary of race is not
the name of an intellectual error or blind spot but instead a fully justifia-
ble way of setting priorities. White racism against Blacks illustrates its
purest and most virulent form. If one understands how racism operates
in this sphere, understanding and countering its milder manifestations
with other groups will be easier.
9 3
88. That treatment includes, for example: a war of aggression that sliced Mexico
roughly in half; immigration enforcement that separates families from their children;
English-only laws that operate harshly against Spanish speakers; school segregation in the
Southwest; signs saying "No dogs or Mexicans"; and management of the island of Puerto
Rico as, in effect, a U.S. colony for over a century. See generally Latinos and the Law, su-
pra note 23 (detailing these and other forms of harsh treatment).
89. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, Critical, supra note 26, at 81-82 (discussing stereo-
type of studious, socially conforming Asian); Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American
Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 Calif.
L. Rev. 1241, 1258-65, 1308-12 (1993) ("This history of discrimination and violence, as
well as the contemporary problems of Asian Americans, are obscured by the portrayal of
Asian Americans as a 'model minority.'").
90. On this common stereotype of the noble savage, see, for example, Richard
Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free
Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1258, 1269-70 (1992) [herein-
after Delgado & Stefancic, Images] (discussing how Hollywood's "'noble savage' films re-
versed the stereotype [built on images of 'war dances, exotic dress, drunkenness, surprise
attacks, scalping, raiding, raping, tomahawks, tomtoms, and torture'] in the opposite di-
rection, portraying Native Americans with exaggerated nobleness").
91. Or so a casual observer may believe on the basis of a single visit to an elegant ca-
sino on Indian land.
92. See Delgado, Locating, supra note 12, at 490 ("Individualistic, no-nonsense
Americans have a limited stock of empathy .... Why risk compassion fatigue by extending
our civil rights sympathies to groups who do not really need them?").
93. See id. at 497 (describing how black-white binary paradigm "retains much of its
original descriptive force" and "[w] hile the issues facing nonblack groups such as Latinos
and Asians are worthy of consideration, policymakers should focus first on the larger prob-
lems of African Americans, the alleviation of which can give other racial minority groups
resolve to combat their own social injustices").
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At best, then, our habits in matters of race will result in an "out of
mind" phenomenon for nonblack groups. They will simply find it hard to
have others take their racial plight seriously. In former years, the Bracero
Program 94 and Operation Wetback 95 prompted no hue and cry from the
ACLU or amicus curiae briefs from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.
Anti-immigration forces today speak in tones that, if they were directed at
Blacks, would be deemed unmistakably racist, yet few condemn them as
such.
96
Few notice that deportation, which the current Administration is
embracing with particular fervor, 9 7 operates somewhat like the slave
trade9s but in reverse. Few notice that Chae Chan Ping v. United States9 is
the functional analog, for Latinos, of Plessy v. Ferguson'00 (for Blacks) in
the way it prevents the legal system from confronting widespread injus-
tices against an entire group.' Still fewer notice that immigration law
94. On formal guest worker (Bracero) programs, see Latinos and the Law, supra note
23, at 433-38 (examining history of guest worker programs from World War I through
"Operation Wetback").
95. "Operation Wetback" was a widespread program carried out under federal auspi-
ces that rounded up Mexican-looking individuals for deportation during a period of eco-
nomic downturn. See Latinos and the Law, supra note 23, at 437-38 (discussing genesis
and effects of "Operation Wetback").
96. For example, immigrants from Latin America are said to arrive in waves or
hordes, to be highly fertile and eager to produce "anchor babies," to cluster together, and
to resist Americanization and the acquisition of American values, language, and hygiene.
See, e.g., Leo R. Chavez, Immigration Reform and Nativism: The Nationalist Response to
the Transnationalist Challenge, in Immigrants Out! The New Nativism and the Anti-
Immigrant Impulse in the United States 61, 61 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997) [hereinafter
Immigrants Out] (discussing "rhetoric of exclusion" used by proponents of restrictive
immigration legislation); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Corrido: Race, Postcolonial Theory,
and U.S. Civil Rights, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1691, 1718-38 (2007) (exploring development and
persistence of"dirt, sexuality, and jabber" as Latino stereotypes).
97. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation Nation, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 2012, at
A27 (discussing fates of many deportees); Louis Jacobson, Has Barack Obama Deported
More People Than Any Other President in U.S. History?, Tampa Bay Times PolitiFact
(Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2012/aug/10/
american-principles-action/has-barack-obama-deported-more-people-any-other-pr/ (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting Obama Administration's high rate of
deportation).
98. That is, deportation often breaks up families, removes human beings without
warning from the communities where they have set down roots and, after an indefinite
period in a large, impersonal detention center, sends them to what may be (for children,
at least) a completely alien land, and does so on a grand scale. See Editorial, Migrants'
Freedom Ride, N.Y. Times, July 29, 2012, at SR1O.
99. 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (declining to reverse exclusion of Chinese man who left
United States with certificate guaranteeing his right to return, during which time Congress
enacted exclusion for everyone who was Chinese).
100. 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (upholding separate but equal facilities for Blacks,
thereby placing host of social practices and laws beyond judicial review).
101. Chae Chan Ping first articulated the plenary power doctrine in immigration law,
which placed that body of law beyond judicial review-just as Plessy did for a host of social
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judges regularly justify harsh action against Latin American petitioners in
disparaging language reminiscent of that of sheriffs and governors in the
pre-Civil Rights Era South.
10 2
Temporal Rises and Falls. - Critics of the black-white binary paradigm
of race analyze a number of its drawbacks for race reformers, including
its impairment of racial coalitions among outgroups. 10 3 They also call
attention to how society often arranges groups' gains and setbacks in a
predictable sequence, so that when one group advances, another expe-
riences regression and defeat.0 4 The black-white binary of race can easily
conceal this checkerboard of racial progress, so that groups celebrate too
soon, not realizing that their current good fortune is destined to be
short-lived.10 5 By the same token, in a period when society feels guilty
about Blacks and offers them relief from oppressive conditions, it may be
making life hard for Japanese, Latinos, or Native Americans, and vice
versa.
106
Unless one understands this pattern-something that the black-
white binary of race can obscure--one is apt to gain little traction from
analogical reasoning. A court or legislature is likely to meet one group's
request dismissively, if, for example, it feels that the nation has suffi-
ciently discharged its obligation toward another that is more central to
practices that demeaned Blacks. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 602-03 ("[I]f the power
mentioned is vested in Congress, any reflection upon its motives . . . would be entirely
uncalled for. This court is not a censor of the morals ... of the government .... When
once it is established that Congress possesses the power to pass an act, our province
ends ... ").
102. See Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical
Perspective, 73 Brook. L. Rev. 467, 468 (2008) ("As Judge Richard Posner noted in 2005,
the adjudication of cases by immigration judges has 'fallen below the minimum standards
of legal justice."' (quoting Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005))).
On the use of disparaging metaphors by the anti-immigration movement, see Keith
Cunningham-Parmeter, Alien Language: Immigration Metaphors and the Jurisprudence
of Otherness, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 1545, 1558 (2011) ("[T]he images of ethnicity and dan-
ger contained in immigration metaphors create the impression that immigrants can only
be described in terms of alienage and criminality.").
103. See Delgado, Toolkit, supra note 50, at 302-06 ("[D]ichotomous thought im-
pairs groups' ability to forge useful coalitions.").
104. Id. at 291-93 ("The history of minority groups in America reveals that while one
group is gaining ground, another is often losing it."). For example, during World War II,
Chinese individuals gained citizenship, while Japanese people were sent to internment
camps.
105. See id. at 286-93 ("Even today, the patchwork of progress for one group coming
with retrenchment for another continues.... [A]t a time when Indian litigators are win-
ning striking breakthroughs for tribes, California has been passing a series of anti-Latino
measures....").
106. See id. at 291-93, 296-99 ("Binary thinking can easily allow one to believe that
America made only one historical mistake-for example, slavery. If so, the prime order of
business is to redress that mistake... [and] the concerns of other groups would come into
play only insofar as they resemble ... that one great mistake.").
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the struggle for civil rights."' 7 Similarly, the court or federal agency may
feel, consciously or not, that the group one is championing is simply not
a minority group in the same way that another is, such as Blacks or Native
Americans. 0 s By merely pronouncing another group central to analysis, a
recalcitrant decisionmaker may rationalize doing nothing for a second
group.
II. REMEDIES FOR NEW WRONGS OR GROUPS
Where, then, shall one look for sources of protection for Blacks fac-
ing new forms of oppression or nonblack groups in need of it for new or
old varieties? As before, it is useful to address separately potential reme-
dies tapping broad social forces and ones seeking relief narrowly in the
form of doctrinal reinterpretation of existing law.
A. Interest Convergence
For both black and nonblack groups, one avenue worth investigating
is simply interest convergence. 0 9 Bell, its originator, usually thought of it
as a barrier-an explanation for the infrequency of Blacks' advances and
their tendency to erode once the celebrations died down and their use to
the white establishment ceased."0
Still, interest convergence may, with a little imagination, yield op-
portunities for civil rights reformers. For example, social sentiment is
currently set against Latinos, especially ones who are working-class and
undocumented,"I and is even more up in arms over terrorism originat-
ing in Middle Eastern communities." 2 Although these observations sug-
gest that difficult times lie ahead for both groups, advocacy could well
107. See id. at 296-99 (observing how Supreme Court justices known for supporting
civil rights also supported legality of racist acts against nonblack groups).
108. See, e.g., Delgado, Locating, supra note 12, at 497-98 (noting how several schol-
ars "make arguments casting doubt on Latinos' entitlement to civil rights solicitude, in-
cluding affirmative action, because they are not deserving"); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's
Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical Scholarship, and the Black-White
Binary, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1181, 1191-92 (1997) (book review) ("Blacks, and even Indians,
were here originally or from very early days. Once society decided to count them as citi-
zens, their thoughts and preferences began to figure into the political equation .... A
Mexican peasant ... can come here only at sufferance .... ").
109. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text (defining interest convergence as
practice of permitting breakthroughs for Blacks only when doing so also benefits Whites).
110. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, Critical, supra note 26, at 20-24 (explaining
Bell's use of concept).
111. On the current wave of anti-Latino broadcasting, popular uproar, and laws, see,
e.g., id. at 471-83, 548-630.
112. See, e.g., Ahmad, supra note 34, at 1262 ("[T] he phenomenon of hate violence
toward Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians is one that appeared to need little explanation; it
was accepted as a regrettable, but expected, response to the terrorist attacks.").
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turn interest convergence to their advantage, while the country's obses-
sion with the "China threat" offers an additional opportunity."'
1. Muslims and Interest Convergence. - The foreign policy establish-
ment currently is fixated on what it sees as an internal struggle within
Islam between a moderate, democratizing faction and a fundamentalist,
puritanical one that embraces a strict interpretation of Sharia law, subju-
gates women, and rejects Western values, which it sees as corrupt, hedon-
istic, and evil. 114 The West, naturally, would like to strengthen the hand
of the first faction vis-A-vis the second.
Recently, radical Islamic leaders have been condemning the West,
particularly the United States, for its mistreatment of women, whom
these spokespersons see as being compelled to dress provocatively and
sell their sexuality for the benefit of men.1 5 They also charge that it is
Americans, not they, who are religiously intolerant, citing, especially, at-
tacks on Muslims or the Muslim religion.
1 1 6
These conditions resemble those Bell used to explain interest con-
vergence in his famous article Brown v. Board of Education and the
113. See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing how China has recently become topic of interest
due to its growing power and global presence).
114. See, e.g., Mohamad Bazzi, Fertile Crescent, N.Y. Times Book Rev., Sept. 11,
2011, at 11, 11-12 (book review) (noting struggle within Islam between radical, jihad-em-
bracing faction and more moderate group); Bernard Haykel, Threat Level, N.Y. Times
Book Rev., Sept. 11, 2011, at 13, 13 (book review) (noting "features of American Islam that
render it largely immune to Al Qaeda's appeal" but claiming "Al Qaeda's defeat will be
complete only if the Arab Spring uprisings bring .. .personal dignity and greater eco-
nomic opportunity to the peoples of the Arab world"); Thomas L. Friedman, Trust, but
Verify, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2012, at A21 ("America needs to offer the Islamists firm,
quiet.., and patient engagement that says: 'We believe in free and fair elections, human
rights, women's rights, minority rights, free markets, civilian control of the military, [and]
religious tolerance . . . and we will offer assistance to anyone who respects those
principles.'"); SamuelJ. Rascoff, Uncle Sam Is No Imam, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 2012, at A25
(noting United States has been making efforts to build networks of "acceptable" Muslim
leaders); Peter Schmidt, Cables Spilled by WikiLeaks Portray College Campuses as
Ideological Battlegrounds, Chron. Higher Educ. (Dec. 8, 2010), http://chronicle.com/
article/Cables-Spilled-by-WikiLeaks/125659/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing how State Department cables increasingly showed concern over radical Islam
and need for West to counter it by easing up on U.S. Muslims and admitting more foreign
students in U.S. universities); see also infra note 115 and accompanying text (noting bin
Laden denounced United States "for its exploitation of women's bodies in dress,
advertising, and popular culture" in 2002 "letter to the American people").
115. See Scott Shane, Pornography Is Found in Bin Laden Compound Files, U.S.
Officials Say, N.Y. Times, May 14, 2011, at A7 (noting that in 2002 "letter to the American
people," bin Laden denounced United States for exploiting women's bodies in dress, ad-
vertising, and popular culture).
116. See, e.g., Profile: Anwar al-Awlaki-Terrorist Propaganda, Anti-Defamation
League (Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.adl.org/main-Terrorism/anwar-al'awlaki.htm?
Multi-page-sections=sHeading_2 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting al-




Interest-Convergence Dilemma. 17 There, Bell scandalized many readers when
he posited that Brown, the crown jewel of American jurisprudence, ar-
rived in 1954-nearly sixty years after Plessy v. Ferguson-not in response
to a belated spasm of judicial conscience. Instead, Brown arrived when it
did because white elite interests required such a breakthrough." 8
Reminding his readers that the NAACP had been litigating school
desegregation cases in the South for decades, getting nowhere or win-
ning, at best, narrow victories, Bell asked why the Court handed down,
for the first time, in 1954, a sweeping decision that essentially gave his
old employer, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, everything it had been
asking for."
19
Bell offered two related reasons, both centering on Cold War poli-
tics. In 1954, the United States was in the opening stages of a worldwide
competition against an atheistic, monolithic adversary, the Soviet Union,
for the loyalties of the uncommitted Third World, much of which was
brown, black, or Asian. 20 Every time the world press splashed photos of
Southern sheriffs beating peaceful civil rights protesters, the Soviets won
points at the United States' expense.' 2' They could make gains by point-
ing out to uncommitted nations in Latin America, Asia, and Africa how
poorly the United States treated human beings with brown skin, and how
these nations would fare better by aligning with the Soviet camp rather
than with the United States.
122
117. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text (introducing interest conver-
gence, which posits that advances for Blacks and perhaps other minorities arrive only
when they also are in interest of elite Whites).
118. See Bell, Dilemma, supra note 26, at 524-26 ("[T]he decision in Brown to break
with the Court's long-held position on these issues cannot be understood without some
consideration of the decision's value to whites .. "); see also Derrick Bell, Race, Racism,
and American Law 25-27, 62, 67-68 (6th ed. 2008) (tracing role of interest convergence
in several black advances).
119. See Bell, Dilemma, supra note 26, at 523-24 ("[T]he issue of school segregation
and the harm it inflicted on black children did not first come to the Court's attention in
the Brown litigation: blacks had been attacking the validity of these policies for 100
years.").
120. See id. at 524 ("[T]he decision helped to provide immediate credibility to
America's struggle with Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging
third world peoples.").
121. See id. ("Time magazine . . . predicted that the international impact of Brown
would be scarcely less important than its effect on the education of black children .. ");
see also Dudziak, supra note 27, at 113-14 ("Brown and the image of American democracy
it projected were thought to be of the utmost importance in a world torn by Cold War
animosities.").
122. See Bell, Dilemma, supra note 26, at 524 (discussing United States' need for
credibility in developing countries); see also Dudziak, supra note 27, at 113 (describing
importance of United States' international image during Cold War); Juan Williams, Eyes
on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years, 1954-1965, at 39, 41-45, 52, 57 (1987) (noting
attention focused on killing of black teenager Emmett Till for saying "Bye, Baby" to white
woman).
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At the same time, U.S. servicepersons of color were returning in
large numbers from World War II and Korea, where they had fought for
democracy and human rights, in many cases experiencing a relatively
racism-free working environment (namely, the U.S. military) for the first
time. 13 These veterans were unlikely to settle back meekly into the for-
mer regime of second-class jobs and deference to Whites. For the first
time in years, racial unrest loomed.
1 24
For both reasons, according to Bell, the U.S. establishment chose
that moment to arrange a spectacular breakthrough for Blacks.1 25 When
the Supreme Court ruled as it did in Brown, the U.S. press trumpeted the
breakthrough, which the world press promptly picked up and broad-
cast.126 Brown v. Board of Education, then, was a (short-lived) victory for
black rights. 127 But it ended up advancing white elite interests even more.
Subsequent research in the files of the U.S. State Department and in the
letters and memoirs of Supreme Court Justices corroborated what Bell
merely posited in his groundbreaking article: When the U.S. Justice
Department threw its weight on the side of the NAACP for the first time
in a school desegregation case, it was responding to repeated exhorta-
tions by the State Department to do so, and for the very reasons Bell hy-
pothesized.1
28
If, as seems likely, interest convergence and international appear-
ances played a large part in producing Brown v. Board of Education and
other advances for Blacks, what does that augur for the current situation?
123. Bell, Dilemma, supra note 26, at 524 ("Brown offered much needed reassurance
to American blacks that the precepts of equality and freedom so heralded during World
War II might yet be given meaning at home."); see also Dudziak, supra note 27, at 83-88
(highlighting role of U.S. military in managing United States' image during Cold War
competition).
124. See Dudziak, supra note 27, at 85 (discussing A. Philip Randolph's concerns that
segregation in armed services would be "a great threat to Negro youth and the internal
stability of our nation"); Dorothy Butler Gilliam, Paul Robeson: All-American 137 (1976)
(noting Paul Robeson's 1949 speech to World Congress of Partisans of Peace in which he
stated "[ilt is unthinkable ... that American Negroes would go to war on behalf of those
who have oppressed us for generations... against a country lthe Soviet Union] which in
one generation has raised our people to the full human dignity of mankind" (quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
125. See supra notes 120-124 and accompanying text (describing impact of interna-
tional image and racial unrest in armed services on Brown decision).
126. See Dudziak, supra note 27, at 107 ("Within an hour after the [Brown] decision
was handed down, the Voice of America broadcast the news to Eastern Europe.").
127. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? 42-57, 127-38 (2d ed. 2008) (documenting small amount of progress that land-
mark decision actually yielded).
128. See Dudziak, supra note 27, at 90-102 ("The Justice Department filed amicus
curiae briefs to inform the Court of important interests at stake beyond those presented by
the parties to the cases."); see also Delgado, Roundelay, supra note 30, at 42-55 (explain-
ing that interest convergence also contributed to breakthrough case of Hernandez v. Texas
for Latino civil rights).
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As mentioned, the United States enjoys little credibility in the minds
of at least some in the Muslim world by virtue of its poor treatment of
domestic minorities and women. 129 Religious fundamentalists and ji-
hadists ask their uncommitted followers if the West offers them a form of
social life worthy of emulation.13 0 If our daily record includes reductions
in women's reproductive services, racial profiling of Latino and Muslim
men, voting identification laws seemingly aimed at reducing black and
brown electoral influence, and a widening wealth and earnings gap be-
tween ordinary people and the super rich, why should Muslims follow
our example?
3 1
To strengthen moderate, secular forces in the Muslim world, the
United States must hold itself out as an example of moderate, secular,
and tolerant government. It cannot deplore fundamentalist Muslim
schools (madrasas) that teach female subjugation and a theocratic form
of government 132 while it is deporting large numbers of brown-skinned
people, 133 jailing many more, 134 and requiring schools to teach
Creationism3 5 and post the slogan "in God we trust" on its walls. 136 Nor
can one easily condemn strict enforcement of Sharia law while the U.S.
judicial system insists on original intent and a literal interpretation of a
two-hundred-year-old document.1 37 Simple interest convergence may eas-
ily, then, end up offering greater hopes for minority advances than litiga-
129. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing Osama bin Laden's cri-
tiques of treatment of women in Western culture).
130. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text (discussing how many of
America's adversaries in Muslim world make propaganda points by pointing out flaws in
United States' social record).
131. See Keith B. Richburg, 10 Years After 9/11, World's Sympathy Has Waned,
Wash. Post, Sept. 7, 2011, at Al (reporting on Pew Research Center survey, which showed
that "large majorities of Muslims have an unfavorable opinion of the United States").
132. See, e.g., Christopher M. Blanchard, Cong. Research Serv., RS 21654, Islamic
Religious Schools, Madrasas. Background 3 (2008) (discussing curriculum in Muslim reli-
gious schools and concerns that these schools are teaching children to hate Western coun-
tries).
133. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (discussing racist tones of anti-
immigration rhetoric).
134. See Alexander, supra note 10, at 173-248 (noting parallels between current sys-
tem of incarceration and slavery and Jim Crow).
135. See Elizabeth Flock, Law Allows Creationism To Be Taught in Tennessee Public
Schools, Wash. Post (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/law-al-
lows-creationism-to-be-taught-in-tenn-public-schools/2012/04/11 /gIQAAjqxATstory.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting many Americans favor this approach and
other states appear poised to follow suit).
136. See David A. Fahrenthold, House Treads Familiar Territory in Vote To Uphold
"In God We Trust," Wash. Post, Nov. 3, 2011, A4 (explaining that House voted 396 to 9 to
reaffirm motto and encourage its display in all public schools and government buildings).
137. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Original Sin: Clarence Thomas and the Failure of the




tion proceeding on the basis of a strained interpretation of the
Thirteenth Amendment.
2. Latinos and Interest Convergence. - What about Latinos in particu-
lar? Interest convergence played a large part in producing the single big-
gest breakthrough for Latino civil rights, Hernandez v. Texas, which for
the first time declared Latinos a minority group entitled to protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment.'38 U.S. power brokers and the intelli-
gence establishment were then highly concerned over Latin American
uprisings, peasant groups, land revolts, and the possibility that Soviet ad-
versaries might gain a foothold in the region. 13 9 They also feared leftist
movements in domestic Latino circles.1
40
Could today's Latinos tap similar concerns? The United States gov-
ernment currently faces no military or economic threat exactly compara-
ble to what it did from the Soviet Union in the fifties. Yet, insurgent in-
digenous activism in Central and South America is a matter of concern,
as is the current raft of leftist leaders in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Cuba.
14 1
Domestically, Latinos have now reached sufficient numbers-one-sixth of
the U.S. population142 -that they can easily tip a national election. And
one of the United States' major rivals, China, has begun making
commercial and political inroads in Latin America. 4 3 It is not far-fetched
to suppose that Latinos, like Muslims, may benefit from tactful invocation
of international appearances to secure better treatment from domestic
authorities, including the courts.
3. China, Russia, and Interest Convergence. - Moderate, democratizing
Islam is not the only foreign group the United States now finds in its in-
terest to cultivate. China and Russia are both emerging as serious com-
petitors for influence in regions where U.S. authority was once exclusive.
138. 347 U.S. 475, 477-78 (1954) ("The State of Texas would have us hold that there
are only two classes-white and Negro-within the contemplation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The decisions of this Court do not support that view."); see also Delgado,
Roundelay, supra note 30, at 42-55 (discussing how interest convergence and elite con-
cerns over Cold War image helped produce breakthrough in Latino legal rights).
139. See Delgado, Roundelay, supra note 30, at 44-48 (discussing U.S. officials' con-
cerns about unrest in Latin America).
140. See id. at 48-49 (discussing U.S. officials' concerns about unrest in major U.S.
cities, including Los Angeles and Denver).
141. See, e.g., Jos6 Luis Morin, Latino/a Rights and Justice in the United States:
Perspectives and Approaches 17-25, 35-41 (2005) (discussing U.S. meddling, coups, and
invasions in that region); Seven Latin American Nations Join Mexico in Arizona
Immigration Lawsuit, Huffington Post (July 19, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/07/20/seven-latin-american-nation_652440.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting repressive anti-immigration law in Arizona drew disfavor in several Latin
American countries).
142. See Sabrina Tavernise, Hispanic Children in Poverty Exceed Whites, Study
Finds, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2011, at A16 ("Hispanics make up 16 percent of the overall
American population ....").
143. See, e.g, James C. McKinley, Jr., Mexico Builds Trade Ties with China, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 13, 2005, at A3 (describing China's growing influence in Latin America).
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In particular, China has begun to cast its eye on Latin America, while
Russia is newly assertive there and elsewhere. For example, when the
United States condemned Russian mistreatment of dissenters and its
conduct of fraudulent elections, Russian leaders pointed out that our
record in these spheres was little better."" Three new U.S. rivals (Muslim
fundamentalists, China, and Russia) could as well have pointed out the
United States' own vast disparities of wealth, particularly with respect to
Latinos, over seventy percent of whom live in poverty, 145 many without
medical insurance and, in the case of the undocumented, in constant
fear of deportation. Neither China nor Russia maintains such a ruthless
policy with respect to deportation, border enforcement, or immigration
restriction as the United States does. 146 Can it be long before they dis-
cover this avenue for making points at the United States' expense?
144. See, e.g., Ellen Barry, On TV, Putin Is Dismissive of Critics Far and Near, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 16, 2011, at A5 (describing how Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
"lashed out repeatedly at the United States" and stated that Senator John McCain "has
enough civilian blood on his hands"); Tom Balmforth, Defiant Putin Mocks and Praises
Opposition, Touts Vague Reform, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Dec. 15, 2011),
http://www.rferl.org/content/putin-annual callinvshow/24422335.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (criticizing Senator John McCain's role in Vietnam in response
to McCain's assertion that Arab Spring uprisings would come to Russia); see also Putin
Takes Jab at U.S., Windsor Star (Can.), Oct. 18, 2011, at D6 (noting Russian leader warned
that our system, with its high inflation, growing debt, and widespread obesity, is no better
than Russia's); Heather Maher, Clinton in Central Asia: Seeking Balance Between
Realpolitik and Rights, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://www.rferl.org/content/clintonin-central_asia_-_seeking-balance-between-real-
politik.and_rights/24370606.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("But Clinton's
meetings with the two authoritarian rulers have some observers asking whether the United
States can maintain its moral status as a defender of human rights if it strikes bargains with
governments that abuse them."); Putin Warns "Mistakes" Could Bring Back '90s Woes,
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.rferl.org/content/putin-
mistakes_could bring-back_1990s_woes/24362626.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (reporting Russian leader warned West to mind its own business and not obsess
over minor Russian curtailment of civil liberties).
145. See Yen, supra note 12 (noting Latinos topped list for poorest group at seventy-
three percent).
146. U.S. policy toward immigrants has often been rude, see, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson,
The New Nativism: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something
Blue, in Immigrants Out, supra note 96, at 165, 167-73 (describing impact of xenophobia
on U.S. immigration policy since nineteenth century), and even lethal, see, e.g., Bill Ong
Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, in Latinos and the Law, supra note 23, at
459, 459-68 (same); Alejandro Portes & Ruben G. Rumbaut, Legacies: The Story of the
Immigrant Second Generation, in Latinos and the Law, supra note 23, at 411, 411-14
(same);John Ross, Days of the Dead, in Latinos and the Law, supra note 23, at 408, 408-11
(noting some of our policies are producing deaths along United States-Mexico border).
Policies toward immigrants in Russia and China seem almost benign by comparison. See,
e.g., Matthew A. Light, What Does It Mean to Control Migration? Soviet Mobility Policies
in Comparative Perspective, 37 Law & Soc. Inquiry 395, 425 (2012) (noting former Soviet
Union's highly bureaucratic and controlling immigration policy, and how current U.S.
immigration policy is similar and "increasingly experimenting with repressive police
methods"); Lisa Bonjanovic, Russia's New Immigration Policy Will Boost the Population,
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B. Reviving Treaty Rights and Modern Land Claims: Lobato v. Taylor
A recent Colorado Supreme Court decision 147 suggests another ave-
nue for at least one domestic group that does not raise some of the prob-
lems likely to arise when proceeding under the Thirteenth
Amendment. 4 ' For Latinos, as already discussed, some of the most press-
ing problems are not close analogs to ones confronting Blacks. 149 As
mentioned, many of those problems stem from conquest, the single most
formative experience for this group and the counterpart of slavery for
Blacks.
150
Conquest, which superimposed one culture and set of laws, lan-
guage, and citizenship rights on top of another, is responsible for many
of the problems listed earlier-loss of language rights, discrimination
based on a foreign-sounding name and accent, and presumed foreign-
ness based on looks and appearance-issues that plague few Blacks.'
51
History also yields a different set of stereotypes for each group: Blacks,
for example, are portrayed as stupid, musical, sexually promiscuous, and
of low moral character. 152 Asian Americans are seen as neat, fastidious,
interested in math and science, and as living boring, predictable lives.
15
1
Latinos are considered whipped, slack people, lacking in ambition,
and deserving of the kind of contempt reserved for losers.'-4 In order to
overcome this stereotype, Latinos must come to terms with the legacy of
conquest and a system of laws, practices, and social conventions that con-
tinues to keep the group down. A recent Colorado land-rights decision
and subsequent congressional report addressed that very challenge, em-
EuroMonitor International (June 14, 2007, 12:19 PM), http://blog.euromonitor.com/
2007/06/russias-new-immigration-policy-will-boost-the-population.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting Russia encourages immigration to counter declining birth
rate); Shen Haimei, Inflow of International Immigrants Challenges China's Migration
Policy, Brookings Inst. (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/
2011/09/08-china-immigrants-shen (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (observing
China is becoming destination for immigrants, especially those who are educated).
147. Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938 (Colo. 2002) (en banc).
148. See supra Part I.B (describing limitations of expanding Thirteenth Amendment
protections to nonblack groups).
149. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text (discussing nonblack groups'
unsuccessful attempts to analogize their predicaments to ones that Blacks suffer).
150. See, e.g., Latinos and the Law, supra note 23, at 2, 8-15, 218-19 (discussing role
of conquest in shaping Latino history).
151. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (observing that many problems
facing nonblack communities are not experienced by Blacks).
152. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 90, at 1262 (describing domi-
nant image of Blacks in popular theater and literature of late eighteenth century).
153. On the model minority stereotype of the quiet, studious Asian, see supra note 89
and accompanying text.
154. Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 90, at 1273 (describing dominant im-
age of Mexican Americans in United States).
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ploying the language and spirit of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, a
major concord with Mexico.
In Lobato v. Taylor, a group of Mexican American farmers sued
Taylor, a developer from North Carolina, who had acquired 77,700 acres
of land in southern Colorado for his own use and development. 55 The
villagers and farmers who lived in the region had been in the practice of
grazing cattle and gathering water and firewood on that very parcel, da-
ting to an ancient deed to a wealthy settler named Charles Beaubien un-
der which he purchased an even larger parcel of land that included
Taylor's 77,700 acres. 156 The deed to Beaubien's land set aside a portion
of it-the one that the contemporary villagers claimed-for the commu-
nal use of Beaubien's friends and neighbors and their descendants to use
for grazing, hunting, watering cattle, and recreation.'
57
Beaubien, who apparently was eager to attract new settlers to the
then thinly populated region, did not reckon with Anglo law, however.
Spanish and Mexican law recognized communal land, called ejidos;,
158
American law, reflecting the spirit of capitalism, did not. With individual
parcels, Mexicans who chose to stay after the change of regime could
continue to own and live on their lands, but, under the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo (which ended the War with Mexico) were required
to re-register them under American law according to a complex system of
requirements, before a series of skeptical land courts and commissions.
159
Many failed to complete the arduous process and lost their lands. But
Beaubien, being wealthy and influential, did not.
After he died, the parcel passed through a few intermediate owners
until it came into the hands of the developer, Taylor, who promptly
closed it off to the outside world. 160 When the locals sued to establish
their right to continue to use the land, the issue before the Colorado
court system was the validity of the 1863 Beaubien document and the use
rights it conferred on the villagers and neighbors.1
6 1
This, in turn, entailed construing the document in light of then-pre-
vailing terms and usages, viz., shortly after the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and during a period when Anglo law was fast developing in the
region. As the Colorado court put it:
We are attempting to construe a 150 year-old document written
in Spanish by a French Canadian who obtained a conditional
grant to an enormous land area under Mexican law and per-
fected it under American law. Beaubien wrote this document
155. 71 P.3d 938, 943 (Colo. 2002) (en banc).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Latinos and the Law, supra note 23, at 34.
159. See id. at 24-34, 862-64.
160. 71 P.3. at 943.
161. Id. at 944-45.
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when he was near the end of his adventurous life in an apparent
attempt to memorialize commitments he had made to induce
families to move hundreds of miles to make homes in the wil-
derness. It would be the height of arrogance and nothing but a
legal fiction for us to claim that we can interpret this document
without putting it in its historical context.
For the most part, the document is reasonably specific in
identifying places where rights are to be exercised.
1 61
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld most of the claims, 163 and a
few years later the federal Government Accountability Office (GAO), re-
sponding to persistent questions about land rights in the Southwest, is-
sued a report to Congress exploring the legality of these ancient
claims.16 4 One of the options it listed for Congress to consider was return-
ing all federal land formerly in the hands of community groups, like the
parcel in Lobato, to its original owners; 11 5 another was simply paying for
land that was lost through procedures lacking in due process in the post-
Treaty years. 
66
Even though Lobato did not turn squarely on treaty rights, it sug-
gested an avenue for litigating at least some Mexican land claims and
possibly other rights, such as those pertaining to language or bilingual
education. 167 Such an approach would begin to craft "civil rights" law for
Latinos that better suits their circumstances and history than either of
the two great civil rights Amendments, which were enacted with the pre-
dicament of the newly freed black slaves in mind. For Latinos, this would
mean development of law aimed at countering the badges and incidents
of conquest, not of slavery. A similar search for Native Americans could
aim to produce law-strengthening sovereignty.' 68 And one for Middle
162. Id. at 947-48.
163. Id. at 957 (upholding villagers' rights to graze and gather firewood and timber
but rejecting their request to hunt, fish, and use property for recreation).
164. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-04-59, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo:
Findings and Possible Options Regarding Longstanding Community Land Grant Claims in
New Mexico 161-70 (2004) (listing five bases for possible redress for lost lands in
Southwest).
165. Id. at 167-68.
166. Id. at 168-69.
167. Community activists have long believed that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
and various subsequent Good Neighbor-type pacts with Mexico provide implicit protection
for cultural and language rights. See Latinos and the Law, supra note 23, at 15-34, 172-74
(noting treaty, as enacted, contained only set of narrow protections, having to do with
land and federal citizenship; left out were host of cultural practices and customs that many
Mexicans held dear, such as speaking Spanish or owning land in common).
168. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832) (noting Native
Americans enjoy some incidents of sovereignty, but are nevertheless defeated nations who
are dependents of United States, hence not fully self-governing); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573-74 (1823) (affirming Anglo displacement of Native American




Eastern people would aim to counter presumed foreignness and the as-
sociations-entirely undeserved in the vast majority of cases-with anti-
Americanism and terror by research into international treaties and con-
ventions.
Further Advantages of the Treaty Approach. - For Latinos, at least, trea-
ties offer more promise than the Thirteenth Amendment, rooted as it is
in Reconstruction ferment centering on the plight of Blacks.' 69 Courts
can expand treaty rights and apply them to new circumstances without
making the large analogical leap that, as already discussed, these other
sources require. Judges can reason that in doing so, they are merely fol-
lowing Congress's sovereign will, thereby countering the plenary power
platitudes that regularly block progress in immigration-related cases.
171
Even when a treaty does not speak directly to an issue, the court can
reason that the agreement, at least, sought to bring the group within the
American polity and is responsible for the group's having resided here
for a long time, 171 thus diminishing the force of the plenary power doc-
trine and increasing the role for judicial scrutiny of a harsh practice.
Framing an issue in treaty terms thus legitimates judicial activism on be-
half of a group and permits courts to take grievances more seriously than
they could if they saw them in conventional terms. A much-cited decision
holds that an alien is "accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights
as he increases his identity with our society." 172 A group whose presence
in the United States came about through a legitimate source, namely a
treaty entered into by two governments, ought to benefit from a similar
degree of presumptive legitimacy and protection.
With indigenous groups, a similar effort is underway in other Anglo-
American common law countries. In Canada 73 and Australia,'74 native
people have won substantial concessions through litigation challenging
ancient bases for Anglo dispossession. In the United States, the Native
American sovereignty movement has brought about reparations and offi-
169. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing enactment of Thirteenth
Amendment during period of civil rights fervor).
170. See supra note 71 (discussing how Congress's harsh immigration policies are
not subject to stringentjudicial review).
171. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (noting if immigrant has
resided in this country for long period of time, he or she is more likely to be integrated in
polity and have stronger case for remaining).
172. Id.
173. Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] S.C.R. 313, 314-15
(Can.) (affirming indigenous land title preexisted Western settlement and providing con-
ceptual basis for overhaul of Canadian land ownership laws).
174. Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 48 (Ausdi.) (rejecting doctrine of
terra nullius, which justified Anglo displacement of indigenous land rights, and setting
stage for return of traditional lands).
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cial apologies from state and federal authorities for similar transgressions
and seems poised to produce even more.175
CONCLUSION
If expansion of existing remedies seems unlikely in today's climate,
civil rights scholars and advocates should consider new avenues. The two
suggested herein (interest convergence and treaties) promise to avoid
many of the drawbacks that plague Reconstruction-era approaches. By
carefully appealing to U.S. geopolitical interests and invoking the spirit
and letter of specific treaties that introduced a group into U.S. society,
nonblack minority groups may, with diligent effort, make small but im-
portant advances.
175. See, e.g., Robert Williams, Savage Anxieties: The Invention of Western
Civilization 236-45 (forthcoming 2012) (discussing sovereignty movement and its insist-
ence on treaty enforcement in United States and Canada). On the quest for reparations
and apologies for victims of historic injustice, including Native Americans, Japanese, and
Blacks, see Roy L. Brooks, Atonement and Forgiveness: A New Model for Black
Reparations, at xii-xiii (2004) ("At least in principle, the federal government has already
accepted the idea that it, like other governments, should provide redress for past atrocities
committed against an innocent people.").
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